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Unexpected Consequences: The Constitutional 
Implications of Federal Prison Policy for 
Offenders Considering Abortion 
Claire Deason∗ 
Leisa Gibson robbed a bank.1 Before she was sentenced, 
Leisa wrote to both her public defender and sentencing judge; 
she told them she was pregnant and wanted an abortion.2 She 
was between 13 and 14 weeks pregnant at the time.3 Leisa’s 
pregnancy continued while she awaited sentencing despite her 
notice to her lawyer and the judge.4 She continued her requests 
for an abortion. “She made repeated requests of virtually eve-
ryone that she came in contact with for assistance in carrying 
out the abortion, but was thwarted at every turn.”5 Four 
months passed; Leisa was sentenced and transferred to federal 
prison.6 After being moved to various prisons over several 
weeks, Leisa arrived at a prison in Lexington, Kentucky, where 
she was told her abortion would be performed.7 However, Leisa 
missed her clinic appointment because she was not told that it 
had been scheduled. After pleading with prison administrators, 
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 1. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 533 (6th Cir. 1991).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 534.  
 7. Id.  
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including medical staff, a prison chaplain, a prison psychiatrist, 
and several United States Marshals, Leisa was turned away 
once and for all by the Lexington prison’s medical staff.8 By 
then she was 23–24 weeks pregnant.9 She gave birth in pris-
on.10 Leisa is not alone.11 Offenders12 like her face bureaucratic 
obstacles to their access to abortion,13 though they retain it as a 
constitutional right.14  
The right to abortion in prison is diluted by Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP) policies which burden its exercise. These policies 
require potentially coercive counseling, empower prison admin-
istrators to control the process, without regard for the time 
constraints associated with pregnancy.15 These policies govern 
all U.S. federal prisons like those in which Leisa was incarce-
rated. 
When Leisa ultimately sued the prison administrators 
from whom she requested assistance, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled against her.16 They stated that, although it may 
appear that Leisa was a “victim of the bureaucracy as a 
whole,”17 no individual prison staff members could be held lia-
 
 8. Id. at 534–35. 
 9. Id. at 535. 
 10. Id.  
 11. The female prison population is increasing at astounding rates. See 
CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., WOMEN IN PRISON FACT SHEET (2008), available at 
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publications/download/wipp/factsheets/
Women_in_Prison_Fact_Sheet_2008.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (noting a 
64% increase in the state and federal female prison population from 1995 to 
2006). The majority of the surveys and case studies cited herein derive from 
federal prisons alone. Where solely federal data is unavailable, I supplement 
demographics cited in this Note with statistics about state prisons or state and 
federal prisons combined. 
 12. I use the term “offenders” in reference to those individuals incarce-
rated in the prison system. 
 13. See, e.g., Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 792–93 (8th Cir. 2008) (de-
scribing a female prisoner’s attempt to obtain an abortion which was ultimate-
ly impeded by prison policies and bureaucracy).  
 14. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (“Prison walls do not form a 
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”).  
 15. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 
P5360.09, PROGRAM STATEMENT, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES (2004), 
available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5360_009.pdf [hereinafter RE-
LIGION POLICY]; FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 
6070.05, PROGRAM STATEMENT, BIRTH CONTROL, PREGNANCY, CHILD PLACE-
MENT AND ABORTION (1996), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/ 
6070_005.pdf [hereinafter ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY]. 
 16. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 1991).  
 17. Id. at 534–35.  
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ble because prison policy placed the responsibility of obtaining 
an abortion with the incarcerated woman18 and no law existed 
at the time that obliged prison staff to help Leisa.19 The law 
has developed since Leisa’s case,20 but prison procedures con-
tinue to jeopardize the rights of female prisoners.  
This Note argues that, although the federal prison policies 
governing abortion are facially constitutional and will therefore 
survive substantive challenges like Leisa’s,21 these policies are 
unconstitutional as applied because they deny pregnant offend-
ers the constitutionally protected procedures that should ac-
company the right to terminate a pregnancy. Part I of this Note 
explains the BOP abortion policies, outlines the state of prison 
abortion law, and describes the procedural due process protec-
tions courts require for offenders. Part II discusses the loo-
pholes and roadblocks that, nevertheless, prevent incarcerated 
women from getting timely abortions. The discussion shows 
that, as applied, the BOP policies violate the Constitution’s 
guarantee of procedural due process. Part III describes the pro-
cedural changes necessary to bring the application of BOP poli-
cy into conformity with the Constitution. A simple, albeit sur-
prising, analogy to prison correspondence policies can provide a 
roadmap for establishing the basic protections of notice and a 
hearing. Part III concludes that, without a change in the appli-
cation of BOP policy, procedural due process violations, and ex-
periences like Leisa’s, are likely to increase with the rise in the 
female offender population.  
 
 18. Id. at 537–38.  
 19. Id. at 535–36 (citing Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanza-
ro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987) (indicating that Monmouth County, which, ac-
cording to the Gibson court, “implicitly extended to prisoners a right not to be 
prevented from having an abortion because of their incarcerated status,” had 
not been decided when prison staff prevented Leisa’s abortion).  
 20. See, e.g., Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 326. 
 21. See Gibson, 926 F.2d at 535–38. (reviewing a challenge to federal pris-
on policy under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fifth, Eighth, 
and Ninth Amendments). Although Leisa was subject to the same policies cri-
tiqued in this Note, she brought suit against individual prison staff members 
in their official capacity through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. This Note focuses on a 
critique of the policy itself, as Gibson demonstrates that § 1983 suits against 
prison staff members neither compensate offenders nor correct policy failures. 
See id.  
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I.  THE CURRENT STATE OF PRISONS AND PRISONERS’ 
RIGHTS   
Over 1,300,000 women were in federal or state prison, on 
parole or probation in the United States in 2006.22 Women 
comprise over 7% of the total prison population.23 Compared to 
the male prison population, this percentage represents a dras-
tic increase.24 From 1995 to 2005, the number of incarcerated 
women rose by 57% while the population of incarcerated men 
rose by only 34%.25 This rapidly growing demographic of female 
offenders faces distinct health challenges. 
A. PREGNANCIES IN PRISON 
Pregnancy rates in prison are rarely calculated. The few 
reported results vary even when studies are conducted.26 Some 
survey the combined female population of state and federal 
prisoners,27 while others survey only particular race or age 
groups.28 In addition, many studies fail to report data on preg-
nancy-related health care.29 All of the available statistics derive 
 
 22. FACT SHEET, supra note 11.  
 23. Id.  
 24. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
198272, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 1 (2000), 
available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/csfcf00.pdf (stating that, between 
1995 and 2000, the population of incarcerated women rose by 38% while that 
of incarcerated men rose by 27%).  
 25. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 215092, 
PRISONERS IN 2005, at 4 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ 
pdf/p05/pdf.  
 26. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SPECIAL REPORT: WOMEN IN PRISON 10 (1991), available at http://www.ojp.gov/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/wopris.pdf [hereinafter WOMEN IN PRISON] (noting that 6.1% of 
state prisoners report being pregnant at the time of admission to prison), with 
THOMAS G. BLOMBERG & KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY, A HISTORY 
OF CONTROL 192–93 (2000) (describing varying statistics, i.e. 6% of women at 
prison intake were reported pregnant in a 1993 study, 5% in a different study 
in 1997, while a 1992 study revealed that 9% of imprisoned women gave birth 
while incarcerated), and BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, NCJ 221740, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mpp.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAL PROBLEMS 
OF PRISONERS] (“[Four percent] of state and 3% of federal inmates said they 
were pregnant at the time of admission”).  
 27. E.g., MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26. 
 28. E.g., WOMEN IN PRISON, supra note 26.  
 29. MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26, tbl.10 (leaving 
blank statistical reporting of pregnancy care and obstetrics examinations for 
pregnant federal offenders due to “small sample size” of approximately three 
percent).  
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from data collected at admission.30 The most recent federal 
study reported that 3% of women admitted to federal prison are 
pregnant at that time.31 Other incarcerated women become 
pregnant while in prison.32 Precise statistics cataloging preg-
nancy rates during incarceration are unavailable, however. 
While studies and statistics are limited, public health officials 
estimate that as many as 6,000 women are pregnant in prison 
at any time in the United States.33  
Despite the lack of data on prison pregnancies, anecdotal 
stories regarding childbirth in prisons have drawn the atten-
tion of interest groups. News media and prisoner’s rights 
groups exposed the practice of shackling women to their hos-
pital beds while they give birth under the supervision of prison 
guards.34 Interested parties, including non-profit organiza-
tions,35 private medical care providers,36 and policy makers, 
 
 30. See, e.g., id. at 1. 
 31. Id. tbl.10; see also Mark Egerman, Comment, Roe v. Crawford: Do In-
mates Have an Eighth Amendment Right to Elective Abortions?, 31 HARV. J. L. 
& GENDER 423, 424 & n.2 (2008) (describing several studies estimating that 
over 6% of incarcerated women are pregnant).  
 32. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 124–25 (3d Cir. 2001) (de-
tailing sexual abuse of inmate by guard); AMNESTY INT’L, “NOT PART OF MY 
SENTENCE”: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY 22 (1999), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/001/1999/en/ 
dom-AMR510011999en.html (reporting the sexual abuse of female offenders); 
Editorial, Doing Something About Prison Rape, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Sept. 26, 
2003, http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2003/prison092603.htm (reporting that as 
many as one in four women report sexual assault by male guards in some 
prisons); Nicole Summer, Powerless in Prison: Sexual Abuse Against Incarce-
rated Women, RH REALITY CHECK, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www 
.rhrealitycheck 
.org/blog/2007/12/11/powerless-in-prison-sexual-abuse-against-incarcerated-
women (sharing the story of an incarcerated woman who explains, “I am 7 
months pregnant [and] I got pregnant here during a sexual assault. I have 
been sexually assaulted here numerous times! The jailers here are the ones 
doing it!”). See generally AMNESTY INT’L, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS: CUS-
TODIAL SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, (2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa 
.org/women/custody/states/federal.pdf. 
 33. Marian Knight & Emma Plugge, Risk Factors for Adverse Perinatal 
Outcomes in Imprisoned Pregnant Women: A Systemic Review, 5 BMC PUB. 
HEALTH 111 (2005). 
 34. Amnesty Int’l, Pregnant and Imprisoned in the United States, 27 
BIRTH 266, 267–68 (2000); Adam Liptak, Prisons Often Shackle Pregnant In-
mates in Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at A16.  
 35. See, e.g., Amie Newman, Pregnant Behind Bars: The Prison Doula 
Project, RH REALITY CHECK, Aug. 2, 2007, http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/ 
2007/08/02/pregnant-behind-bars-the-prison-doula-project. 
 36. See Correctional Medical Services, Our Mission, Vision & Values, 
http://www.cmsstl.com/about-us/mission-vision-values.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 
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have campaigned to ensure pre- and post-natal care for female 
offenders who choose to give birth.37  
Yet, abortion, a valuable option for incarcerated women, is 
undefended. It is particularly suited for those who struggle 
with public assistance, drug addiction, or who are at risk of los-
ing their child to the foster system.38 Women’s access to safe 
abortion in prison has not received the same attention as pre- 
and post-natal care. Without any support of the sort private or-
ganizations and prison administration provide for pregnancy 
and childbirth, incarcerated women seeking abortion services 
are forced to navigate prison bureaucracy alone.  
Prison chaplains offer spiritual guidance during this 
time.39 Faith is an important part of the lives of many incarce-
rated women. In fact, many women find faith while in prison.40 
For many, the exercise of new-found or reawakened faith pro-
vides a support network for facing prison life.41 Faith also plays 
an important role for many women in their decision to abort a 
pregnancy.42 However, an increasing number of religious pro-
 
2009) (describing a private medical provider to prison populations that 
“take[s] a caring and compassionate approach to serving the medical needs of 
inmates and [is] committed to offering our services in a dignified, respectful 
manner”). But see Leah Thayer, Hidden Hell: Women in Prison, AMNESTY 
INT’L MAG., Fall 2004 (describing negative results of privatized medical servic-
es in women’s prisons, including cutting gynecological examinations as unne-
cessary budgetary expenses).  
 37. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Female Offenders: Birth Control and 
Pregnancy, http://www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/female.jsp (last visited Mar. 
9, 2009) (describing the “Mothers and Infants Nurturing Together” Program, a 
“community residential program” for “women who are pregnant at the time of 
commitment,” offering “pre-natal and post-natal programs such as childbirth, 
parenting, and coping skills classes”).  
 38. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; see also ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLI-
CY, supra note 15, at 4 (describing the responsibility of incarcerated women for 
placing their newborn children in the care of social agencies); KATHRYN WAT-
TERSON, WOMEN IN PRISON: INSIDE THE CONCRETE WOMB 216–17 (Ne. Univ. 
Press 1996) (1973) (describing the experience of an incarcerated mother and 
her three-year-old son being separated after a prison visit).  
 39. See WATTERSON, supra note 38, at 161–62 (sharing the story of Father 
Charles Repole, a chaplain at the women’s jail on Riker’s Island who describes 
counseling women over the years, including persuading women towards adop-
tion over keeping custody of children).  
 40. See, e.g., id. at 142–46 (sharing the story of Barbara Baker, a woman 
seeking religious community in prison who says, “[w]hen I talked to Reverend 
McCracken, I found a people”).  
 41. See Samantha M. Shapiro, Jails for Jesus, MOTHER JONES, Nov.–Dec. 
2003, at 55–56 (describing the community atmosphere of a faith-based prison 
program meeting).  
 42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (“One’s philosophy . . . [and] 
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gram administrators in prisons identify themselves as evangel-
ical, or born-again, Christians.43 This faith does not recognize a 
woman’s right to choose abortion.44 The BOP policies governing 
abortion include a religious counseling component which could 
expose pregnant women to potentially coercive counseling with 
these chaplains. The BOP policies create additional bureaucrat-
ic obstacles that overshadow the benefits of spiritual counsel-
ing. 
B. ABORTION POLICY OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 
Two BOP policies address incarcerated women considering 
abortion.45 The “Birth Control, Pregnancy, Child Placement 
and Abortion” policy was implemented to “provide[] an inmate 
with medical and social services related to . . . pregnancy . . . 
and abortion.”46 According to this policy, an inmate is responsi-
ble for informing the prison medical staff when she suspects 
she is pregnant.47 The medical staff then informs the inmate’s 
case manager when the pregnancy is confirmed.48 The offender 
is then exposed to medical, religious, and social counseling to 
assist her in making the decision whether to terminate her 
pregnancy.49 
The BOP’s religious counseling services are described in a 
separate policy on religious practices.50 This policy states that 
“[p]regnant inmates will be offered religious counseling to aid 
in making an informed decision whether to carry the pregnancy 
to full term.”51 The abortion policy does not explicitly require 
 
one’s religious training . . . are all likely to influence and to color one’s think-
ing and conclusions about abortion.”); Dorie Giles Williams, Religion, Beliefs 
About Human Life and the Abortion Decision, 24 REV. OF RELIGIOUS RES. 40, 
45–46 (1982) (describing studies showing a correlation between theological be-
liefs about fetus personhood and subjects’ decisions whether to abort a preg-
nancy). 
 43. See ReligionLink, Evangelicals Expand State Prison Ministries (Jan. 
5, 2004), http://www.religionlink.org/tip_040105c.php [hereinafter Religion-
Link]. 
 44. See Ben Witherington III, Why Do Evangelical Christians Believe 
Abortion Is Murder?, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/72/story_7223_1.html 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2009).  
 45. See ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15; RELIGION POL-
ICY, supra note 15. 
 46. See ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 1.  
 47. Id. at 2. 
 48. Id. at 3.  
 49. Id.  
 50. RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 8.  
 51. Id.  
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this counseling.52 However, the abortion policy could be read to 
provide no alternative method for obtaining an abortion with-
out the submission of documents by a religious counselor, effec-
tively requiring this counseling.53 The abortion policy states 
that “[t]he Warden shall ensure that each pregnant inmate is 
provided . . . counseling services.”54 This mandate indicates 
that counseling is likely to be the norm in cases involving abor-
tion requests. Indeed, the policy does not explicitly provide any 
way to obtain an abortion without undergoing religious coun-
seling.55  
The policy allows for counseling “for religious needs other 
than those of a specific faith tradition,”56 because of the “par-
ticular needs of women.”57 In other words, an offender who is a 
devout Jew may find herself discussing her choice to abort with 
a Catholic priest. There is no explanation of the “particular 
needs” to which the policy alludes.  
All staff members, including medical and religious staff, 
not wishing to facilitate abortion for the offender are exempt 
from participation.58 Since this applies to all staff, the prison 
chaplain is among those who may choose not to participate.59 
Prison chaplains may be evangelical Christians and act as the 
primary administrators of religious programming in federal 
prisons.60 The evangelical influence in women’s prisons may be 
attributed to the purported dominance of Christian organiza-
tions as recipients of money under the Bush Administration’s 
 
 52. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 3. 
 53. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15.  
 54. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 55. Id.  
 56. RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 8.  
 57. Id.  
 58. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 1.  
 59. See id. at 1, 4.  
 60. See RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 7. Other religiously affiliated 
representatives can have access to offender populations and may represent 
persuasive, and powerful political and religious perspectives on abortion. See 
Emily Bazelon, Is There a Post-Abortion Syndrome?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 
21, 2007, at 42. This article describes Rhonda Arias, an ordained “evangelical 
preacher[,]” who leads the “Oil of Joy for Mourning” “abortion-recovery minis-
try” and counsels incarcerated women in Texas prisons, seeking to prevent fu-
ture abortions, which she links to drug abuse. Id. Arias explains, “[i]n Ameri-
ca, we have a big drug problem, and we don’t realize it’s because of abortion.” 
Id. Arias conducts mock memorial services for offenders’ aborted babies, allow-
ing women to be in the chapel for hours, share their stories, hug, and dance 
with one another. Id. 
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push to federally fund faith-based service organizations.61 In 
addition, non-profit evangelical organizations ease budgetary 
concerns in prison administration by adding to or, at times, re-
placing existing prison chaplain services altogether.62 For ex-
ample, Prison Fellowship Ministries, an evangelical religious 
programming organization, claimed to control programs for 
1,843 prisons during the fiscal year of 2005 to 2006.63 These re-
ligious leaders subscribe to a programming philosophy focused 
on conversion and evangelism.64 Other chaplains subscribe to 
an all-inclusive philosophy that supports all denominations.65 
Unfortunately, evangelical prison ministries have a growing 
presence due to cuts in chaplain services.66  
The institution’s chaplain is responsible for contracting 
outside religious leaders to meet with offenders when the chap-
lain cannot personally deliver the needed religious services.67 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons religious counseling policy es-
tablishes procedures for arranging such meetings.68 The policy 
provides four available options to facilitate a meeting.69 The of-
fender may request that a religious counselor come to the pris-
on as, first, a volunteer, second, as a contractor, or third, for a 
pastoral visit.70 Finally, the offender may also meet with the 
 
 61. See Megan A. Kemp, Blessed Are the Born Again: An Analysis of 
Christian Fundamentalists, the Faith-Based Initiative and the Establishment 
Clause, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1523, 1540 (2007) (noting that most data demon-
strates that the majority of federal funding to religious organizations goes to 
Christian groups); see also ESTHER KAPLAN, WITH GOD ON THEIR SIDE: HOW 
CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISTS TRAMPLED SCIENCE, POLICY, AND DEMOCRACY 
IN GEORGE W. BUSH’S WHITE HOUSE 40–45, 63–67 (2004). 
 62. See ReligionLink, supra note 43.  
 63. PRISON FELLOWSHIP MINISTRIES, LETTERS OF THE HEART: ANNUAL 
REPORT (2005–2006) 7 http://www.prisonfellowship.org/media/ 
prisonfellowship/Docs/pf/annual_reports/2005-06_Annual_Report.pdf (citing a 
monthly average attendance of 121,260 offenders at its programming).  
 64. See, e.g., Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inside PFM, http://www 
.prisonfellowship.org/contentindex.asp?ID=25. 
 65. See American Correctional Chaplains Association, What Are Correc-
tional Chaplains?, http://www.correctionalchaplains.org/what_is_the_acca.htm 
(“Chaplains are . . . responsible for ministry to prisoners regardless of religious 
beliefs or affiliation, using outside sources for assistance when needed.”).  
 66. See ReligionLink, supra note 43.  
 67. See RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 10. All contractual represent-
atives will receive equal status and treatment, unless there are conflicts with 
institutional security and order. Id. 
 68. Id. at 6, 10, 16.  
 69. Id. at 10, 16.  
 70. Id. at 8, 10, 16.  
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chaplain of the prison for pastoral care or counseling.71 Each 
option requires paperwork and possibly credential checks.72 
Notably, through the approval process, the chaplain, warden, 
and regional director control the amount of time that passes 
until the offender receives the requested religious services and 
may determine that the requested counselor cannot visit the 
prison.73 If the chaplain refuses access to a requested religious 
counselor, the offender is left to meet with the chaplain, who 
may attempt to evangelize the prisoner, and, thus, encourage 
her to continue her pregnancy.74 
Once the pregnant offender meets with medical, religious 
and social counselors, the involved staff members are required 
to submit written documentation of the counseling sessions to 
the offender’s central file.75 The offender, too, must submit a 
signed written statement of her election to abort her pregnancy 
and acknowledge that she had the opportunity for counseling 
and information.76 
Should the offender choose to terminate her pregnancy, the 
abortion is scheduled by the Clinical Director and the offender 
is responsible for paying for the abortion, unless the life of the 
mother will be in danger if the fetus is carried to term or if the 
pregnancy is a result of rape.77 BOP policy does not provide a 
scheduling timeline other than the order of steps taken.78 Ar-
ranging for the abortion to take place is likely the most arduous 
step of the process, however, because the number of facilities 
that perform the service has been declining,79 so many areas 
without abortion providers remain in the country.80 In order to 
evaluate the constitutionality of these BOP policies, it is neces-
sary to examine the development of abortion law in prisons.  
 
 71. Id. at 6.  
 72. Id. at 6, 10, 16.  
 73. See id. at 6, 8–10, 16. 
 74. See ReligionLink, supra note 43.  
 75. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 3.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and 
Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 11 (2008) 
(showing that the number of abortion providers in the United States decreased 
from 2,380 in 1992 to 1,787 in 2005).  
 80. Id. (demonstrating that in 2005, 87% of counties in the United States 
did not have an abortion provider and there was a 2% decline in the total 
number of abortion providers in the United States from 2000 to 2005). 
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C. FEMALE OFFENDERS RETAIN A LEGAL RIGHT TO ABORTION 
This Section describes abortion law as it relates to incarce-
rated women. The Section first addresses Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,81 the modern judicial 
standard for abortion rights. It next reviews conflicting circuit 
court precedent relating to abortion rights in the prison.  
1. Undue Burdens on Women Seeking Abortion: Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
The Supreme Court decided Casey in 1992, nineteen years 
after Roe v. Wade established the right to an abortion.82 Since 
Roe, state legislatures had established policies that effectively 
limited access to abortion.83 Responding to patient frustration, 
Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania challenged several of 
those policies in Casey.84 
The Court’s decision created the undue burden standard 
for abortion cases.85 This standard rejected legislation that 
placed a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion of a nonviable fetus,”86 regardless of the stage of 
pregnancy. The Court applied this standard to invalidate a 
spousal notification provision87 which required that a woman 
seeking an abortion “sign a statement indicating that she ha[d] 
notified her husband of her intended abortion.”88 The undue 
burden standard presented a new way of looking at abortion: 
instead of focusing on a woman’s right, as was the case in Roe, 
Casey shifted the debate to one about obstacles and road-
blocks.89 Obstacles and roadblocks in the prison context face 
the Turner v. Safley standard of review.90  
 
 81. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 82. Id.; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).  
 83. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 844–45, 879–901 (analyzing several “in-
formed consent” requirements including a twenty-four-hour waiting period, 
required parental and spousal consent, as well as reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements).  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 874–78.  
 86. Id. at 877. 
 87. Id. at 887–98 (invalidating a spousal-notification provision in part be-
cause of possible coercion and abuse by husband, which effectively threatened 
the wife’s safety and liberty to choose abortion). 
 88. Id. at 844.  
 89. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (describing the appli-
cation of the right of privacy to a woman’s choice whether to have an abortion 
and the detriments that would be imposed on a woman forced to carry an un-
wanted pregnancy), with Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 (describing the failure of Roe 
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2. The Legal Standard for Prison Rights Litigation: Turner v. 
Safley  
The Turner v. Safley “legitimate penological interest” stan-
dard applies to challenges to prison policy within the context of 
inmates’’ constitutional rights.91 Turner was a class action law-
suit brought by Missouri offenders challenging prison regula-
tions limiting the ability of offenders to marry while in prison 
and to correspond with offenders at different institutions.92 The 
offenders challenged the regulations as unconstitutional, ar-
guing that the correspondence policy and limitation on prison 
marriages unconstitutionally infringed their rights.93 The 
Court held the correspondence regulation to be valid and the 
marriage limitations to be invalid, establishing the “legitimate 
penological interest” standard for determining what constitutes 
permissible infringement on the constitutional rights of the in-
carcerated.94 The Court explained, “when a prison regulation 
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is va-
lid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
ests.”95 
The Turner Court described four considerations for deter-
mining the legitimacy of the state’s interests.96 First, the Court 
explained that there must be a “‘valid, rational connection’” be-
tween the “prison regulation and the legitimate governmental 
interest put forward to justify it.”97 Next, the Court considered 
“whether there are alternative means of exercising the right 
that remain open to prison inmates.”98 The Court then ad-
dressed the “impact accommodation of the asserted constitu-
tional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the 
allocation of prison resources generally.”99 Finally, the Court 
offered that the lack of alternatives demonstrated the reasona-
bleness of the regulation and clarified that this test is not a 
 
to acknowledge the strong state interest in fetal protection).  
 90. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 78 (1987) (requiring only a legitimate 
penological interest when infringing on a constitutional right of a prisoner).  
 91. Id. at 89.  
 92. Id. at 81–82.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 89, 91, 99–100. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 89–90.  
 97. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).  
 98. Id. at 90.  
 99. Id.  
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“least restrictive alternative” test.100 This means that prison 
administration need not consider all available options and 
choose that which most allows the offender to exercise her con-
stitutional right.101 The Turner Court validated the challenged 
correspondence policy,102 but it struck down the prison mar-
riage policy as having no reasonable relationship to a legiti-
mate penological interest.103 Courts have subsequently applied 
Turner in cases challenging the constitutionality of prison poli-
cies.104 
3. The Standard Can Favor Offenders: Monmouth County 
Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro 
The Turner standard worked in favor of inmates who 
brought suit against a prison in Monmouth County State Cor-
rectional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro and successfully 
challenged a prison policy that severely restricted abortion 
access.105 The Third Circuit applied the Turner standard in 
Monmouth County just months after the Turner decision, and 
ultimately invalidated the challenged policy.106 The case was a 
class action brought by offenders challenging a prison medical 
policy requiring them to obtain a court-ordered release to leave 
prison to receive an elective, nontherapeutic abortion.107 De-
spite the fact that the lower court applied a “compelling state 
interest” test instead of the Turner rationality standard, the 
Third Circuit affirmed in part and modified in part the district 
court’s injunctive relief.108 The Third Circuit additionally em-
 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id.  
 102. Id. at 91.  
 103. Id. at 91, 97–100.  
 104. See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345, 349–53 
(1987) (applying Turner to reverse an appellate court decision that vacated 
and remanded the district court holding of a prison regulation preventing 
Muslim offenders from participating in a service central to the Islamic faith as 
unconstitutional); Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 477, 479, 483–87 
(5th Cir. 2004) (applying Turner to uphold a policy requiring a court order to 
obtain temporary release for offenders seeking elective medical procedures, 
including abortions); Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 
F.2d 326, 331–34, 338–44, 351 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying Turner to invalidate a 
prison policy requiring a court-ordered release for offenders to receive nonthe-
rapeutic, elective abortions). 
 105. See Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 338–44, 351. 
 106. See id.  
 107. Id. at 329, 351.  
 108. Id. at 330 (describing the district court’s reasoning using the compel-
ling-state-interest standard of review); id. at 351–52 (affirming or modifying 
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phasized that protection of the rights of offenders, due to the 
nature of their imprisonment, can require public funds and as-
sistance beyond what is required in the free world.109 
The court considered the first element of the Turner stan-
dard of whether there was a valid connection between the regu-
lation and a legitimate government interest.110 However, it con-
cluded that the court-ordered-release policy failed to rationally 
connect to any legitimate governmental interests.111  
The Third Circuit next considered Turner ’s second element 
and recognized that in the unique case of abortion, “time is 
likely to be of the essence.”112 Acknowledging that women, upon 
the court release, “may encounter additional delays in schedul-
ing the actual procedure,”113 the court determined that delays 
due to policy roadblocks like the court-ordered release create a 
variety of risks for women.114 The court noted that when time is 
a central consideration and “the only means available to effec-
tuate [the decision to abort] are laden with probable delays, 
such means are inadequate and essentially deprive a woman of 
the ability to exercise her constitutional right” to abortion.115 
Finally, the court considered that a lack of alternative to 
abortion, or, alternatively, their existence, serves to indicate 
whether the regulation is reasonable.116 Considering that the 
prison provided for pre- and post-natal care,117 the court con-
cluded that funding abortions presented no significant burden 
to the prison, despite the state’s asserted financial and admin-
 
all elements of the injunction, and requiring the County to arrange for trans-
portation to and from the clinic).  
 109. Id. at 341 (citing Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (indi-
cating that prison officials must accommodate prisoners with religious dietary 
restrictions)); id. (“It is but just that the public be required to care for the pris-
oner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of liberty, care for himself [or 
herself . ]” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976))) (internal quo-
tations omitted).  
 110. Id. at 338, 338 n.19 (explaining that, because the court-order require-
ment centered on the nature of the treatment and not the offender’s security 
status, the policy cannot be rationally related to a legitimate security interest).  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 339 (quoting H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412 (1981)). 
 113. Id. at 340.  
 114. Id. at 339.  
 115. Id. at 340 n.21.  
 116. Id. at 344. 
 117. Id. at 341 (“[Accommodating abortion costs] certainly imposes no 
greater burdens than already exist under the County’s accepted responsibility 
to provide all pregnant inmates with proper pre- and post-natal care.”). 
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istrative concerns.118 The Third Circuit ultimately rejected the 
District Court’s holding that the County does not need to fund 
elective abortions, but explicitly notes that this does not equate 
to an affirmative duty to do so.119 This marked the first success-
ful challenge to restrictive prison abortion policies after Turn-
er.120 
The court indicated that the Turner standard should, how-
ever, be applied with leniency toward the government. Accord-
ing to the Third Circuit, the Turner standard is applied 
“whether a challenged regulation ‘effectively prohibit[s], rather 
than simply limit[s], a particular exercise of constitutional 
rights.’”121 This principle is illustrated in Victoria W. v. Larpen-
ter, where the Turner standard worked against incarcerated 
women facing roadblocks to abortion.122  
4. The Standard Can Work Against Offenders: Victoria W. v. 
Larpenter 
In Victoria W. v. Larpenter, a female offender brought a 
civil rights action challenging the constitutionality of a Louisi-
ana prison policy requiring women to obtain a court-ordered re-
lease from prison to receive an abortion.123 Meetings with ad-
ministrators, filing reports, and other procedural roadblocks 
prevented Victoria from receiving an abortion,124 even though 
she requested the procedure immediately after discovering her 
pregnancy. At the time of her release, Victoria’s pregnancy had 
advanced past the point of legal abortion in Louisiana.125 
The court applied the Turner standard and concluded that 
the policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological in-
terests because it was established for all elective medical pro-
cedures, not only abortion.126 The court distinguished Mon-
 
 118. Id. at 341 & n.22.  
 119. Id. at 343. 
 120. Id. at 331 (describing how the Turner decision was rendered following 
oral argument in Monmouth County).  
 121. Id. (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)).  
 122. 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 123. Id. at 477–78. 
 124. Id. at 478–80 (explaining that Victoria received prenatal care while 
she attempted to fulfill requirements to meet with the Head Nurse, schedule 
an abortion, meet with her lawyer, and obtain a court order). 
 125. Id. at 480 (“Victoria was released on October 13, 1999, too late to ob-
tain a legal abortion in Louisiana.”). 
 126. Id. at 486. Among the interests asserted by the prison were prison re-
sources, inmate security, and potential liability. Id.  
 1392 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1377 
 
mouth County, explaining that the policy challenged there was 
specific to abortion.127  
These cases demonstrate that courts have used Turner to 
require access to abortion and to deny it. A challenge to the 
BOP abortion policies would likely follow either the Monmouth 
County or Victoria W. precedent. The Third Circuit’s approach 
in Monmouth County should control because the roadblocks es-
tablished in the BOP policy are specific to the abortion decision 
alone, and do not apply to all elective medical procedures as in 
Victoria W.128  
The standards set by Turner address the substantive 
rights retained in prison. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments protect both substantive rights 
and the procedure for protecting these rights,129 as discussed 
below.  
D. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE 
INCARCERATED  
The doctrine of procedural due process requires that proce-
dural safeguards be applied where deprivation of a liberty or 
property right occurs.130 These safeguards are guaranteed 
where codified law affirmatively protects or recognizes the exis-
tence of a right,131 but also where the Constitution protects 
such rights.132 
To determine whether procedural protection is due, one 
must look to the “context of the inmate’s confinement.”133 Pro-
 
 127. Id. at 487–88.  
 128. See id. at 486.  
 129. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 685–87 (2d 
ed. 1988).  
 130. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1972) 
(finding no right to procedural due process where the interest fails to satisfy a 
threshold definition of liberty or property); Philip W. Sbaratta, Note, Sandin v. 
Conner: The Supreme Court’s Narrowing of Prisoners’ Due Process and the 
Missed Opportunity to Discover True Liberty, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 744, 749 
(1996) (describing the Roth holding as it relates to liberty and property inter-
ests).  
 131. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (describing that, 
while a good-time credit is not constitutionally guaranteed, due process protec-
tion of the right to good-time credits was afforded because the state had recog-
nized the right in legislation). 
 132. See Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process 
Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 
491–92 (1984) (describing that interference with “life, liberty, or property” 
triggers due process). 
 133. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990). 
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cedural protections exist where deprivation of a right is unre-
lated to regularly imposed penal confinement.134 By contrast, 
prisons are not required to ensure procedural protections where 
deprivations are “well within the terms of confinement ordina-
rily contemplated by a prison sentence.”135 In most cases, courts 
defer to prison administrators in determining what falls within 
the “context of confinement.”136 
Minimum due process protection includes notice and a 
hearing.137 However, “[t]he very nature of due process negates 
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to 
every imaginable situation.”138 Courts have required various 
combinations of an administrative hearing, timely meetings 
with a warden,139 access to counsel,140 the opportunity to 
present witnesses to the prison administrators,141 and the as-
surance of a “neutral and detached” procedural determina-
tion142 when a property or liberty interest is at stake.143  
An offender is entitled to the minimum protections of no-
tice and a judicial hearing if she can show that the right she 
has been deprived of is affirmatively, statutorily, or constitu-
tionally protected by law and that the deprivation is not within 
the terms of her confinement.144 Courts may require procedure 
more specific than simple notice and a hearing, however, de-
pending on the right of which the offender has been deprived.145 
 
 134. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223–24 (“[P]rison authorities are best equipped to 
make difficult decisions regarding prison administration.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 559 (1974) (quoting Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). 
 138. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 
895 (1961).  
 139. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558.  
 140. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).  
 141. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). 
 142. Id.  
 143. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (“[The due process] analysis as to liberty 
parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property.”).  
 144. See id. (“[A] person’s liberty is equally protected, even when the liber-
ty itself is a statutory creation of the State.”); see also Michael Irvine, Chapter 
17: Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to Obtain Relief from Viola-
tions of Federal Law, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305, 321 (2000) (noting 
that protected liberty interests are those “that are unusually burdensome in 
relation to ‘the ordinary incidents of prison life’”).  
 145. See, e.g., Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1218–19 (2004) (holding 
that an offender was entitled to notice of charges, opportunity to present wit-
nesses and evidence in defense of those charges, and a written statement by a 
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Indeed, some liberty interests require extensive procedural pro-
tections to make them meaningful.146 Abortion rights are rec-
ognized as time sensitive147 and related to potentially injurious 
procedures,148 and therefore should be eligible for heightened 
procedural protection. Prison policies already provide heigh-
tened due process protections for other individual rights, such 
as the First Amendment right to uncensored correspondence.  
Prison correspondence procedure provides a model for pris-
on due process protections. BOP abortion policies implicate a 
liberty interest like the interest in uncensored communication 
between offenders and their correspondents.149 The Constitu-
tion ensures certain protections and procedural remedies for of-
fenders whose correspondence is kept from them150 because of 
the liberty interest at stake151 and limits on the “context of . . . 
confinement.”152 These protections apply to all prison policies 
implicating protected constitutional rights. The BOP abortion 
policies are no exception.  
 
decision maker of evidence relied upon and reasons for classification before 
being classified as a sex offender). 
 146. See Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting injunc-
tive relief where prison correspondence was being kept from offenders); Bul-
lock v. Barham, 23 F. Supp. 2d 883, 885 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (concluding that in-
junctive relief was cognizable where an offender was threatened with bodily 
harm). 
 147. See, e.g., Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 
326, 339 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting the increased medical risk associated with de-
laying abortion).  
 148. There is evidence that even early abortion procedures are major medi-
cal undertakings, strongly weighing in favor of sound procedural protections 
surrounding access to the procedure. See RU-486: Demonstrating a Low Stan-
dard for Women’s Health?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th 
Cong. (2006). 
 149. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418 (1974) (“The interest of 
prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter . . . 
is plainly a ‘liberty’ interest within the meaning of the [Due Process Clause of 
the] Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).  
 150. Krug, 329 F.3d at 696–97 (describing that an offender must retain the 
right to notice and two-level review when a prison withholds correspondence).  
 151. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).  
 152. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990). 
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II.  THE BUREAU OF PRISONS POLICY IS 
UNCONSITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO PREGNANT 
OFFENDERS CONSIDERING ABORTION   
The first section of Part II shows that the BOP policy is fa-
cially constitutional. The second section applies the policy to 
pregnant offenders considering abortion, revealing several 
flaws. The final section presents an argument that the BOP 
policies, as applied to pregnant offenders, violate the constitu-
tional right to procedural due process.  
A. THE BUREAU OF PRISONS ABORTION POLICIES ARE FACIALLY 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
The Turner standard works in favor of the Bureau of Pris-
ons in a facial challenge to the substantive policy. First, there 
is likely a “valid, rational connection”153 between imposing se-
curity protections and effective counseling requirements and a 
state interest in ensuring that offenders exercise their abortion 
rights in an informed and secure manner. Second, the BOP 
could argue that there is no need for “alternative means of ex-
ercising the right”154 to abortion simply because the policy, on 
its face, does not prevent abortions. Third, the BOP can make a 
strong case that “accommodation of the asserted constitutional 
right” will have a negative impact on “guards and other in-
mates”155 due to personal objections to abortion, a concern ex-
pressed in the staff-exemption to the abortion policy.156 Fourth, 
Turner emphasizes that prison policy addressing constitutional 
issues need not be the “least restrictive alternative” availa-
ble.157 
Thus, under Turner, the legitimate penological interest in 
security justifies regulating, but not eliminating, offenders’ 
access to abortion services. On its face, the policy is constitu-
tional. How, then, is one to help women like Leisa Gibson? The 
rights conferred on her were not unconstitutionally restricted 
in substance, yet their exercise was prevented. This problem is 
one of procedure, requiring a procedural due process analysis. 
 
 153. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
 154. See id. at 90.  
 155. See id.  
 156. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 1.  
 157. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.  
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B. APPLICATION OF THE BUREAU OF PRISON POLICIES 
Applying the BOP policies to the circumstances expe-
rienced by incarcerated women like Leisa Gibson reveals six 
significant problems. The policies provide no notice of options 
for pregnant offenders, rely on intimidating communication 
with guards, fail to incorporate time sensitivity, allow staff 
nonparticipation without limitation, place responsibility in the 
hands of the offender without giving her the tools to exercise 
that responsibility, and allow for unnecessary and potentially 
strategic time manipulation by prison officials.  
First, the BOP abortion policy does not include a procedure 
for alerting female offenders to the possibility they may be 
pregnant, nor to the options available to them if they are.158 In 
fact, Leisa Gibson was not informed of a medical appointment 
scheduled for her, which was her last opportunity for an abor-
tion.159 Without this kind of information, pregnant offenders 
are left not knowing to whom to turn once they become aware 
of their pregnancy.160 Weeks may pass before an offender ap-
proaches prison administrators.161  
This raises the second failure of the policy’s procedures. 
Moments alone with guards are likely the only means by which 
to communicate a health concern.162 Indeed, Leisa Gibson was 
housed in a jail guarded by U.S. Marshals, in whom she con-
 
 158. See ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15.  
 159. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 534 (6th Cir. 1991).  
 160. The average offender would likely be unaware of an early stage preg-
nancy at prison admission. The majority of female federal offenders are incar-
cerated for drug offenses, FACT SHEET, supra note 11, and nearly 40% of pris-
oners reporting a medical condition enter federal prison with a drug addiction. 
MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26, tbl.7. The same number 
report using drugs in a month before their arrest. Id. Drug addiction interferes 
with a woman’s ability to care for her health, including monitoring her repro-
ductive status. Women admitted to prison addicted to drugs often experience 
withdrawal, which can be confused with the symptoms of early pregnancy. In 
the last study performed, only 18% of female offenders receive drug treatment 
in federal prisons. FACT SHEET, supra note 11. Pregnancies are only occasio-
nally detected during physical examinations at prison admission. MEDICAL 
PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26, tbl.8. While 78.1% of female offend-
ers report having an obstetrics exam “since admission,” statistical reports do 
not clarify the amount of time that passes from admission before an offender 
receives medical care. Id. tbl.10. 
 161. See WATTERSON, supra note 38. 
 162. See http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/index.jsp, for a BOP de-
scription of the low staff-to-inmate ratio for a low security prison facility, indi-
cating less contact between offenders and staff. 
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fided but who failed to help her.163 Without clear guidelines of 
how to obtain an abortion,164 the BOP policy relies entirely on 
communication between guard and offender and the opportuni-
ty for confidential conversation as the means by which preg-
nant offenders are able to gain access to the abortion proce-
dure. This reliance on confidential communication is misplaced 
because offenders may fear and distrust prison guards, who 
wield power over them.  
Once a staff member is alerted to a suspected pregnancy, 
the offender’s case manager must be notified.165 This process 
may consume a significant amount of time166 because at no 
point does the BOP policy dictate a time limit for involving the 
case manager, arranging a medical appointment or requiring 
that the abortion option be made known to the offender.167 This 
is a policy failure because offenders may be unaware of their 
right to terminate their pregnancy, or the amount of time it 
would take to arrange the procedure from prison.  
The third problem presented by the BOP policy is thus that 
the offender has neither the knowledge nor tools to pressure 
the prison administration to arrange for appointments and 
schedule meetings with the case manager. Fourth, even when 
the schedule is finally arranged, aspects of the policy allow staff 
members to further delay access to abortion services. The policy 
states that any staff members, including medical staff, may 
refuse to participate in the care and treatment of an offender 
considering abortion.168 Delays are therefore possible at both 
the administrative and staff levels of the prison power struc-
ture.  
 
 163. Gibson, 926 F.2d at 534.  
 164. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 2 (noting each 
offender is responsible for alerting medical staff when she suspects she is 
pregnant, but not specifying how to access or communicate with the appropri-
ate administrator).  
 165. See id. at 3.  
 166. See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 478–79 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that two weeks passed between Victoria’s request for a meeting with 
the Head Nurse and the meeting).  
 167. See ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15. 
 168. See id. at 1 (“A staff member who wishes not to be involved in arrang-
ing an elective abortion will not be required to do so.”); cf. Amy Bergquist, 
Note, Pharmacist Refusals: Dispensing (With) Religious Accommodation Un-
der Title VII, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (2006) (“Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act restricts both private and public employers’ right to terminate, discipline, 
or refuse to hire employees on religious grounds.”).  
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The fifth problem presented by the BOP policy initially ap-
pears positive for offenders. The BOP abortion policy requires 
that the offender be entirely responsible for the decision to ab-
ort her pregnancy.169 However, Leisa Gibson’s case illustrates 
the damaging results of a policy which places responsibility in 
the hands of the offender when she is not in a position to exer-
cise it. The Sixth Circuit presumed that placing this responsi-
bility in the offender’s hands removed any responsibility from 
the prison administration.170 In reality, of course, with no ob-
jective information about abortion rights, no willing participa-
tion from prison administration or staff, and no understanding 
of where to begin the process for obtaining an abortion, this re-
sponsibility cannot be meaningfully exercised.  
Finally, the BOP policy allows for unnecessary and poten-
tially strategic delay. This is especially the case when the war-
den and chaplain become involved because the BOP policy go-
verning religious counseling encourages delay. If, and when, an 
offender is made aware of her option to abort, she would likely 
turn to a guard, who would notify a case manager. The case 
manager would speak with the Warden.171 The BOP abortion 
policy places no time restrictions on the Warden for meeting 
with offenders considering abortion.172 The Warden must offer 
medical, religious, and social counseling.173 The Warden will 
consult with the chaplain, the coordinator of religious pro-
gramming, to arrange religious counseling if requested. In ad-
dition, an offender may be transferred from facility to facility, 
as Leisa Gibson was three times, “passing the buck” on to other 
prisons entirely.174 Prison administrators may justify these 
procedures with security and financial concerns, but the 
process could, intentionally or not, delay an abortion beyond le-
gal limits.  
Access to abortion is time-sensitive. Victoria W. demon-
strates that an abortion can be prevented by simply stalling the 
 
 169. See ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 3 (“[An] in-
mate has the responsibility to decide either to have an abortion or to bear the 
child.”).  
 170. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 537–38 (6th Cir. 1991).  
 171. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 3 (explaining 
that the Warden is the primary administrator for assisting an inmate with 
counseling involving abortion). 
 172. See id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Gibson, 926 F.2d at 534–35.  
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procedure.175 Even when prison administrators act in good 
faith, as they arguably did in Victoria W.,176 it is likely that 
mere bureaucracy can prevent abortion. The risk that prison 
administrators will act in bad faith increases, however, where 
the prison chaplain is anti-abortion and religious programming 
in federal prisons is dominated by private, evangelical Chris-
tian missionary organizations. Tales of these groups’ influence 
on pregnant offenders abound in Christian religious program-
ming materials. One describes the Cinderella story of a woman 
who found Christ, had a baby, and recovered from a crack ad-
diction.177 With prison programming centered on this kind of 
religiosity, and ample power placed in the hands of the persua-
sive chaplain, it is likely that at least some of the time con-
sumed in implementing the policy stems from strategic mani-
pulation of an offender’s decision.  
Some pregnancies are not detected before the second or 
third month (and even later for drug-addicted and unhealthy 
women) and abortion is only available until the sixth month in 
most clinics.178 There is a narrow opportunity for women in late 
first or second trimester pregnancies to avail themselves of 
abortion services. The current BOP procedure simply takes too 
long, especially considering the opportunity for manipulation. 
In addition, prison administrators are not required to commu-
nicate with the offender about the details of the process and her 
rights, there are no procedural time constraints, and there is no 
way for an offender to challenge administrative roadblocks to 
abortion in time to get access to the procedure safely and legal-
ly. Although the BOP policy is substantively constitutional on 
its face, its application to pregnant offenders considering abor-
tion violates procedural due process.  
C. AS APPLIED, THE BOP POLICIES FAIL TO MEET PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS  
Under the procedural due process doctrine, where there is 
a right in place through statute or the Constitution, removal of 
 
 175. See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 478 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 176. See id. at 490 (“[P]rison officials and medical staff reasonably applied 
the policy.”). 
 177. Hope Today Prison Fellowship, Redeemed Drug Addict Returns to Jail 
to Spread the Word, HOPE TODAY: STORIES OF TRANSFORMATION, 
http://www.pfm.org/article.asp?ID=491 (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).  
 178. See Patricia Miller, The Last Resort: Abortion Providers in Kansas and 
Mississippi Hold Ground Despite States’ Attacks, MS., Fall 2005, at 16, (noting 
that only two clinics in the country perform late-term abortions).  
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that right must be accompanied by procedural accommoda-
tions.179 The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect the right to choose abortion, and the BOP 
policy also explicitly codifies it.180 While this recognition of the 
right renders the policy facially constitutional, this recognition 
of the offender’s constitutional liberty interest places it square-
ly within the realm of procedural due process. Regardless of the 
BOP’s ability to limit rights in the prison context based on legi-
timate interests,181 the prison must provide offenders with pro-
cedural protections.182  
Furthermore, the “context of confinement” analysis shows 
that removal of the right to choose abortion must be accompa-
nied by procedural due process protection.183 Removal of a right 
is in the “context of the inmate’s confinement” where depriva-
tion of the right is related to regularly imposed penal confine-
ment.184 Challenges to prison policies under this standard 
usually address punishments added to a prison sentence, like 
solitary confinement or removal of prison privileges.185 These 
punishments are within the context of confinement because 
they can be expected in an ordinary prison sentence. However, 
mandatory childbirth is not within an expected prison sen-
tence.186 Even with deference to prison administrators,187 
forced childbirth cannot be construed as lawful punishment.188 
 
 179. See Herman, supra note 132, at 491–92. 
 180. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); ABORTION AND PREGNANCY 
POLICY, supra note 15, at 1, 3; RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 8.  
 181. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (concluding that a regula-
tion is valid even if it impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, if it is “rea-
sonably related to legitimate penological interests”).  
 182. See Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 
341 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that the state must provide certain resources for 
offenders in order to ensure the safe exercise of their constitutional rights, 
such as particular foods for religious purposes); Stanford H. Kadish, Metho-
dology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudications—A Survey and Criticism, 66 
YALE L.J. 319, 340 (1957) (explaining that procedural safeguards are impor-
tant “even in an area of legitimate governmental concern”).  
 183. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990). 
 184. Id. at 220.  
 185. See Whitlock v. Johnson, 982 F. Supp. 615, 617–18 (N.D. Ill 1997) 
(upholding a procedural due process challenge against a disciplinary hearing); 
Irvine, supra note 144, at 321. 
 186. Elizabeth Budnitz, Not a Part of Her Sentence: Applying the Supreme 
Court’s Johnson v. California to Prison Abortion Policies, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
1291, 1302 (2006) (describing the physical burden of carrying an unwanted 
pregnancy in prison). 
 187. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 224.  
 188. See John F. Hagan, Jail OKs Altered Abortion Policy; Settlement In-
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In fact, scholars argue that forced childbearing in prison 
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, violating the 
Eighth Amendment.189 Procedural protections are warranted 
because abortion rights are statutorily and constitutionally rec-
ognized and removing them is not traditionally acceptable 
criminal punishment. 
In Monmouth County,190 the Third Circuit reviewed the af-
firmative obligation of the state to provide resources for offend-
ers to adequately exercise the rights they retained in prison.191 
The court emphasized that the protection provided in the free 
world must be heightened in the prison context because offend-
ers are totally dependent on the state.192 Monmouth County 
urges a comparison of free world standards to the needs of of-
fenders in order to determine the constitutional adequacy of 
prison policies.193 This principle is particularly applicable to de-
termine the adequacy of current BOP procedure vis-à-vis abor-
tion. 
Outside the prison context, Casey would determine that 
unidentified time constraints and religious coercion with no 
access to other resources amount to an undue burden on a 
woman’s right to choose abortion.194 The obstacles established 
in the BOP abortion policies are comparable to the spousal noti-
 
cludes Payment to Woman Jailed by Former Judge, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land), June 4, 2002, at B1 (describing the six-month suspension of a judge for 
allegedly jailing a female defendant after learning about her desire to seek 
abortion). But see People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984) (affirming the parole condition that a woman convicted of child endan-
germent not conceive any more children because the condition was “related to 
child endangerment, the crime for which [the] appellant was convicted”). 
 189. Budnitz, supra note 186, at 1321−22; Egerman, supra note 31, at 437 
(arguing that forced childbirth “represents a serious violation of basic human 
dignity in direct violation of the Eighth Amendment”); Tecla Morasca, Invo-
luntary Childbirth and Prisoners’ Rights: Court-Order Prison Policy Violates 
Fundamental Rights, 32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 69–73. 
 190. Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 341 
(3d Cir. 1987).  
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. at 341−42 (describing a prison’s obligation to accommodate reli-
gious diet, feed, clothe, and house offenders).  
 193. Id. at 341 (“Automatically applying in the prison context the tenets 
that define the government’s obligation to its free world citizens denies . . . 
inmates’ right to have their constitutional claims balanced against the state’s 
legitimate interests in operating its prisons.”).  
 194. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992) 
(striking down spousal-notification provision because of the “troubling degree 
of authority” it gave to a husband over his wife).  
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fication provision invalidated in Casey.195 The Court invali-
dated this provision because it placed a “troubling degree of au-
thority”196 in the hands of someone other than the woman mak-
ing the choice,197 a person whose intentions might not be in her 
best interest.198 The BOP policy mimics this problem by placing 
ultimate control over the abortion decision in the hands of pris-
on administrators, not the offender herself.199 Like the concerns 
with spousal consent, the interests of prison administrators 
may not align with those of pregnant offenders.200 The BOP pol-
icies, like the free-world spousal consent provision,201 place an 
undue burden on the woman’s decision to choose abortion in 
prison.  
One could argue that the Casey standard should not be 
considered when analyzing rights in the prison context.202 After 
all, Turner specifically indicates that a less rigid standard ap-
plies when substantive rights are at issue in prison.203 Howev-
er, Monmouth County indicates that if a policy would be overly 
burdensome in the free world, it certainly cannot work in the 
prison context where the right is retained.204 Under Monmouth 
County, the prison must provide the means to ensure that 
access to retained rights is protected and meaningful. The Gib-
son court recognized this fact when it stated that Monmouth 
County “implicitly extended to prisoners a right not to be pre-
vented from having an abortion because of their incarcerated 
status.”205 Casey re-framed the issue of abortion as a debate 
about the manageability of hurdles and roadblocks. In light of 
 
 195. Id. at 887–99.  
 196. Id. at 898. 
 197. See id. at 896 (“The Constitution protects individuals, men and women 
alike, from unjustified state interference, even when that interference is 
enacted into law for the benefit of their spouses.”).  
 198. See id. at 893 (listing the myriad reasons a woman would be afraid to 
tell her husband her desire to seek abortion). 
 199. But see ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 3 (“[T]he 
inmate has the responsibility to decide either to abort or bear the child.”).  
 200. See Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 
336–38 (3d Cir. 1987) (describing the state’s interests and weighing them 
against the offenders’ interests).  
 201. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 898.  
 202. But see Budnitz, supra note 186, at 1294−95 (arguing that Johnson v. 
California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), supports the proposition that courts reviewing 
prison abortion policies should apply intermediate scrutiny in accordance with 
Casey instead of Turner).  
 203. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
 204. Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 341.  
 205. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1991).  
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this modern construction of abortion rights in Casey, the Mon-
mouth County approach to prison abortion should be applied, 
and the Victoria W. approach should be rejected. Under the 
Monmouth County standard, the BOP policy has failed to pro-
vide adequate procedures by which offenders may exercise their 
retained rights to choose abortion and challenge potential re-
strictions thereto.  
Perhaps indicative of the social marginalization of female 
prisoners, there is little awareness of this problem. Outside the 
sparse litigation that has taken place challenging state prison 
policies, no person or organization has taken direct action 
against prisons that limit female offenders’ access to abortion. 
None of the major pro-choice advocacy groups include discus-
sions of the issue on their websites or in printed promotional 
material. Still, potentially thousands of women continue to suf-
fer in silence.206 As the population of women in prison increas-
es, the risk of constitutional violations also increases.  
In order to avoid the detrimental impact of these policies 
on individual prisoners, this Note offers a workable solution to 
amend the BOP policies. While the abortion issue is controver-
sial, access to the procedure continues to be protected by the 
Constitution.207 As long as this is the case, solutions are re-
quired to clear bureaucratic barriers to access. The traditional 
procedural protections of timely notice and a hearing are re-
quired to prevent abuses of policy and procedural roadblocks.  
III.  AMENDING THE BUREAU OF PRISONS POLICIES TO 
CONFORM TO THE CONSTITUTION   
Changes in policy are required for the BOP abortion poli-
cies to provide adequate procedural due process. Policy must 
provide timely notice and the opportunity for a hearing to of-
fenders who are deprived of access to abortion services. These 
procedural protections are included in BOP policy governing of-
fender correspondence.208 That policy provides a model for 
change to the abortion policy. The addition of a time limit, no-
 
 206. See MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26, tbl.10; Quick 
Facts About the Federal Bureau of Prisons, http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (indicating that 13,273 women are incarcerated in 
federal prisons).  
 207. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).  
 208. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT, CORRESPON-
DENCE, available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5265_011.pdf [herei-
nafter CORRESPONDENCE POLICY]. 
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tice requirements, and opportunities for appeal and review will 
bring the BOP abortion policy into conformity with the Consti-
tution. These changes would be easy and inexpensive to imple-
ment because structural protections of similar rights already 
exist in the federal prison system.209  
A. THE REQUIREMENT OF TIMELY NOTICE PROTECTS TIME-
SENSITIVE ABORTION RIGHTS 
In order to meet the timely notice requirement, the BOP 
abortion policy must recognize the time-sensitive nature of 
abortion procedures.210 Failure to respond to requests for abor-
tion during the early stages of an offender’s pregnancy jeopar-
dizes the affirmatively granted right to choose abortion, either 
by inadvertent failure to accelerate the process or manipulation 
by prison staff.211 The BOP must notify the offender of her right 
to choose abortion, the procedure for obtaining an abortion, and 
any delays potentially arising in the process. 
The BOP policy relating to offender correspondence pro-
vides an element of time sensitivity. First, the correspondence 
policy requires that offenders receive notification of rules relat-
ing to their right to private correspondence immediately upon 
entering a federal facility.212 Second, the correspondence policy 
requires frequent internal review of decisions by prison admin-
istrators to limit an offender’s right to correspondence.213  
The BOP abortion policy does not recognize the time sensi-
tivity of threatened rights, although access to an abortion is ar-
guably more time-sensitive than access to one’s letters and 
magazines. Correspondence access is reviewed every 180 
days.214 An identical review, described in the following section, 
of an offender’s requests related to pregnancy should be re-
 
 209. Id. at 6–8 (explaining the procedures for limiting correspondences and 
providing standard notice and consent forms for offenders).  
 210. See Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 
339 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 211. See, e.g., Reproductive Rights in Prison, Posting to Reproductive 
Rights Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/reproductive_rights/2007/ 
02/reproductive_ri.html (Feb. 1, 2007) (“[A] worker at the jail refused to give 
the woman her second dose of emergency contraception to help prevent a poss-
ible pregnancy from [her rape by a prison guard], because he objected to the 
medication on religious grounds.”).  
 212. CORRESPONDENCE POLICY, supra note 208, at 6. 
 213. Id. at 18 (“The Warden shall review an inmate’s restricted special 
mail status at least once every 180 days.”). 
 214. Id.  
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quired every fourteen days to ensure that the review operates 
within the time constraints of abortion access. These frequent 
procedural reviews would not violate the Turner standard be-
cause they are already incorporated in prison procedure, daily 
operations, and costs as they relate to correspondence.  
The policy must also limit prison administrators to a rea-
sonable time for arranging an abortion for offenders. Injecting 
time sensitivity into the policy allows an offender to have an 
abortion quickly and provides effective monitoring to prevent 
strategic delay of the process. Recognition of the time-sensitive 
nature of the right to abortion, paired with notice of that right, 
and the chance it may be obstructed, would allow an offender to 
understand the options available to her. This change could be 
implemented by requiring that the procedure be performed 
within one month after the offender requests an abortion.  
Notice of one’s rights and the procedures for exercising 
them are also lacking in the BOP abortion policy. Once again, 
the BOP correspondence policy provides a model.215 The first 
paragraph of the policy requires that the guidelines themselves 
“be widely available to staff and inmates through posting on 
bulletin boards, placement in the institution library, or other 
appropriate means.”216 The BOP ensures that offenders have 
access to information about their right to correspond by posting 
the policy itself throughout the prison. A similar requirement of 
posting notices in prison locker rooms or restrooms would in-
form offenders of their right to abortion and of the process for 
obtaining the procedure. These changes could be easily imple-
mented using the same infrastructure that implements the cor-
respondence policy.  
The correspondence policy also includes specific language 
for notifying offenders before restricting their right to corres-
pond. The policy requires prison staff to inform offenders of the 
possibility that their right will be limited,217 and when the right 
is limited, notice must be given describing the reasons for the 
limitation and the options for redress.218 The right to abortion, 
and the limitations on it, would be clearer and better communi-
cated if the BOP abortion policy included identical require-
ments for communication to offenders. After an offender re-
quests an abortion, prison administrators should have to 
 
 215. See id. at 6.  
 216. Id. at 1. 
 217. Id. at 6. 
 218. Id. at 8, 13.  
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provide her with a comprehensive description of the process 
from beginning to end, either during a hearing or in writing. 
This clear communication would enable offenders to prepare 
and plan for abortion. It would also diminish the likelihood that 
abuse of the policy would go unchecked. 
For example, the requirement of religious counseling se-
verely restricts an offender’s access to abortion. Adding the 
elements of time and notice to the abortion policy would allow 
an offender to schedule counseling with the chaplain in ad-
vance of her decision, or to request an outside counselor of her 
choice without running out of time for an abortion. Because the 
offender would be notified of the requirement earlier and the 
administration would be required to arrange counseling within 
a time that does not restrict the right to access abortion, of-
fenders would be better able to get meaningful counseling.  
The time and notice requirements may result, however, in 
some pregnant offenders not receiving religious counseling due 
to constraints on administrator’s time for planning the proce-
dure. In anticipation of these circumstances, the BOP should 
develop an expedited background check policy for outside coun-
selors with less stringent security restrictions for pregnant of-
fenders considering abortion in order to enable these women to 
get access to meaningful counseling with a counselor of their 
denomination.219 The offender could receive counseling perti-
nent to her faith at the most useful time, when she is still ca-
pable of having an abortion. An offender should be notified of 
this expedited process only when she reveals her pregnancy. 
This would minimize any security threat posed by offenders’ 
meeting using expedited background checks for visits when 
they are not actually in need of pregnancy counseling.220  
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
PREVENTS POTENTIAL COERCION 
After notifying an offender of her right to abortion, the 
process involved, and her access to religious counseling, the 
BOP policy must afford basic hearings for offenders requesting 
 
 219. See RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 16.  
 220. Security restrictions for female offenders are already limited. See Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons, Institutions Housing Female Offenders, http://www 
.bop.gov/locations/female_facilities.jsp (last visited Mar. 9, 2009); Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons, Prison Types & General Information, http://www.bop.gov/ 
locations/institutions/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (describing the cha-
racteristics of minimum- and low-security facilities, including the absence of 
perimeter fences in some minimum security prisons). 
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changes in policy or assistance in exercising the right to choose 
abortion. Administrative review is a procedural safeguard re-
quired by the Due Process Clause that would accommodate 
such requests. Administrative review calls for, at a minimum, 
two-person review of restrictions placed on protected rights.221  
In the case of prison correspondence, courts require that 
prison policy involve an unbiased two-person review of a deci-
sion to censure correspondence.222 The BOP correspondence 
policy includes specific language required for notifying offend-
ers of their right to written and oral appeal of a restriction of 
their right.223 Similarly, administrative review must be estab-
lished to review a complaint in the event an offender challenges 
abortion policy after receiving notice. A review by two disinte-
rested persons would be beneficial to offenders because it would 
likely reveal any staff attempts to undermine the process. The 
review is also an opportunity to evaluate the pregnant offend-
er’s situation and allow advocacy on the part of one or both re-
viewers to hasten the process. A hearing would also provide of-
fenders with a forum to request a meeting with a specific 
counselor, or one other than the chaplain, in order to access 
personalized religious counseling. Like notice of the rights in-
volved, access to administrative review must be timely in order 
to conform to the requirements of due process. Implementation 
of this change to the BOP abortion policy would also be fairly 
simple; the two-person review panels meet to review com-
plaints on a regular basis and the complaint procedure is al-
ready available for other aspects of prison policy.  
These hearings must consider injunctive relief as a remedy 
to give female offenders access to abortion services. Although it 
is not a foundational procedural due process guarantee, injunc-
tive relief is necessary because the BOP policy implicates a pro-
tected right, abortion access, that is time-sensitive. In addition, 
removing the right to abortion causes bodily harm because the 
alternative is childbirth, which is a physical ordeal for all wom-
 
 221. Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d 692, 697−98 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
state must provide review by two people, one of whom is not involved in deny-
ing the right, before it can deny a constitutional right to an offender).  
 222. Id.; see also CORRESPONDENCE POLICY, supra note 208, at 8 (“The 
Warden shall refer an appeal to an official other than the one who originally 
disapproved the correspondence.”).  
 223. CORRESPONDENCE POLICY, supra note 208, at 8, 13.  
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en,224 regardless of their interest in abortion. In addition, this 
kind of relief has been granted in other prison cases,225 includ-
ing abortion.226 For example, one of the rare stories of prison 
abortion that has been made public describes the story of “Jane 
Doe,” a minor who was forced to continue her pregnancy be-
cause her sentencing judge would not to allow her to leave her 
residential treatment facility for an abortion.227 “Jane” was ul-
timately granted injunctive relief by a different judge.228 The 
relief required the facility to inform women of their right to 
choose abortion and the procedures required to obtain the ser-
vice.229 
To avoid the physical burden of an advancing pregnancy, 
an offender is entitled to an expedited administrative hearing 
that considers injunctive relief.230 Injunctive relief should be 
the primary administrative remedy available to a pregnant of-
fender challenging BOP policies preventing her from accessing 
abortion, including the BOP religious counseling policy. These 
challenges would allow an offender to circumvent religious 
counseling if time constrains her access to a counselor of her 
denomination.  
Timely notice to offenders of the right to choose abortion 
while in prison and the procedure for doing so, as well as ad-
ministrative hearings to review cases, would improve the BOP 
abortion policy. In addition, the BOP policies must provide of-
fenders with access to two person hearings which rule on in-
junctive relief and access to expedited screening of religious 
counselors arranged for or requested by pregnant offenders. 
These solutions would alleviate the insurmountable burdens 
that the current BOP abortion policy imposes on pregnant 
women.  
 
 224. The physical risks associated with pregnancy increase substantially 
when a pregnant woman is incarcerated. See Egerman, supra note 31, at 434–
36.  
 225. See Krug, 329 F.3d at 699; Bullock v. Barham, 23 F. Supp. 2d 883, 885 
(1998).  
 226. See Rachel Roth, Searching for the State: Who Governs Prisoners’ Re-
productive Rights?, 11 SOC. POL. 411, 412 (2004). 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. at 412 n.1. 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. at 412 (describing a judge’s decision to hold an emergency hearing 
to determine the value of Jane’s claim for injunctive relief because no remedy 
at law could prevent the health risks a delay to abortion presented).  
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  CONCLUSION   
Leisa Gibson spent the duration of her pregnancy in feder-
al prison, being systematically ignored and misled by prison 
administrators.231 She was forced to carry her unwanted preg-
nancy to term and ultimately to give birth in prison.232 The 
BOP policy enabled prison officials to “pass[ ] the buck,”233 leav-
ing Leisa a “victim of the bureaucracy as a whole.”234 Further-
more, there were no remedies available for Leisa to recover her 
losses from the prison officials who caused them by preventing 
her from having an abortion.235 This Note presents a different 
way of looking at this problem: as one of procedural, not subs-
tantive, rights.  
Indeed, the BOP policies surrounding prison abortion are 
facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied to women 
like Leisa because they fail to provide adequate procedural due 
process. The number of women in federal and state institutions 
has increased at almost twice the rate of incarcerated men for 
over ten years.236 Given the growing number of female offend-
ers, the impact of these damaging policies is significant. There 
are more women like Leisa Gibson.  
About three percent of female federal inmates report being 
pregnant at the time of their incarceration.237 This number will 
grow as the incarcerated female population grows. It is a popu-
lation comprised of women with financial, social, and behavior-
al problems that make abortion a valued option. Indeed, “[f]ar 
from being criminal predators, female inmates tend to be impo-
verished, drug addicts, victims of sexual assault or domestic vi-
olence, and mothers.”238 The unique experiences of female of-
fenders require adequate procedural protections to preserve the 
rights of this growing population.  
 
 231. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 534–35 (6th Cir. 1991).  
 232. Id. at 535.  
 233. Id. at 535.  
 234. Id. at 534–35.  
 235. Id. at 536, 538.  
 236. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 4. 
 237. MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26, tbl.10.  
 238. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 26, at 191. 
